John Boehner and the General Will

As Matt discussed in his post, the “End of Boehner,” today marks a monumental moment in Congress. And, like in all other defining moments, we must ask ourselves what there is to learn and gain from exploring their causes and consequences. Matt explained that throughout his term, Boehner was criticized for being “too cautious in his approach to force the Obama Administration to make policy concessions.” It can be surmised that Boehner was forced out of his speakership and representative position out of frustration and a feeling of useless in the face of such extensive political disagreement.

Boehner approached his speakership in what I would consider an expected manner—as Matt mentioned, Boehner carefully walked the line between leading the party and leading the house as a whole (he is—or was— in fact, the speaker of the house, not the speaker of the republican party). His speakership was defined by an intention of compromise; although, it seemed by the end of his tenure, he was more often pressed to compromise with the more conservative wing of his party rather than Democrats on the opposite side of the isle.

My curiosity lies in this: we tend to think that the end-all, be-all panacea for the woes of congress is moderation and compromise. We tend to believe that this current Congress of ours is so ineffective because it refuses to make concessions. But perhaps Boehner’s resignation shows that concessions and compromise don’t lead to progress and productivity. Perhaps, those who criticize Boehner from within the Republican Party (although largely radical in their views) are identifying an issue which is not so far from the truth. These fellow congressmen were begging Boehner to make some sort of decisive decision—to use his position as speaker to take control of what occurs in Congress. So, what do you do when your many members of your party are uninterested in compromising? I think the conventional wisdom would dictate to—pardon my French—screw the party and be the bigger congressman and opt for compromise. Or, do you go with your party’s wants and utilize your position of power to work to impose legislation that favors your party’s ideology?  

I think this binary brings up an interesting question of what the role of Congress truly is. Is congress an institution of representatives intended to yield moderate decisions out of compromise? Or is it an institution where parties are meant to fight for power and let the best man, or party, win? Is it better to produce lukewarm legislation, which accomplishes less and makes no one happy or necessarily unhappy? Or is it more advantageous to pass legislation that makes substantial changes but which favors a certain party? Or should we be okay that in the face of unsuccessful compromise, we let nothing happen at all?

I think that the answer to all of those questions is an unfulfilling one—it depends. It depends, largely, on what the climate on politics is. Perhaps in a political climate with little or less polarization (think of Congress after GOP power grab in 95) compromise is the best and an achievable answer. But perhaps, Boehner’s resignation speaks to the fact that we might (let me emphasize, might) have the wrong idea in believing that compromise is the only answer. Maybe progress, even at the expense of the wishes of the opposing party, is worth making decisive decisions and power grabs. That doing something—even if that something might upset a lot of people—is better than doing nothing at all.

As a closing thought, I would like to briefly bring up John Locke. In John Locke’s fundamental essays on the nature of politics and democracy, he discusses the importance of identifying and working towards the general will. The general will is not, he explains, what it sounds. It is not what everyone, generally, wants. It is what is best, in general, for the nation as a whole. Perhaps, we have confused the true general will with its most logical definition. We perceive the general will as what will satisfy the highest number of individuals, when in reality, the general will is not what will satisfy but what will protect and benefit the highest quantity of people, whether they believe that it will or not. Republicans and Democrats simply have different definitions of what the “general will” is. However, both, at least in Locke’s eyes, would be perfectly entitled to pursue the upholding of their definitions. So—maybe, John Boehner, too, was confused about what defines the general will. Maybe, if John Boehner had been willing to use his position to give his party the power to do what it willed, he would still be Speaker of the House.