In
the midst of the government shutdown, approval of all members of Congress is at
risk. Specifically for Charlie Dent, his approval rating for people other than
his constituents may be the one at risk. In 2011, Republican’s redrew district
lines in Pennsylvania to make the House seats safe (Lehigh Valley Live, 2013).
Because of this, Charlie Dent would have to do something insane to lose to
Democratic competition. But what could be more of a reality is Charlie losing
to a Republican in the primary. In my last post I mentioned this briefly, but
it has popped up in the news quite a bit in the past week. After voting against
his party leader in relation to the clean bill, strong Republicans could find
another strong Republican to fund and run against Charlie in the primary. If
the Pennsylvania Republicans are more extreme, Charlie could have a real chance
at losing that primary. Fortunately, that doesn’t seem to be the case, at least
for the moment. Fifty-two percent of Charlie’s constituents support continuing
funding for the government, including the health care law (Lehigh Valley Live,
2013). Since this is just over half, this number is subject to change,
especially with all the recent press Charlie is receiving.
Although
Charlie’s seat in the House seems relatively safe at the moment, this just
shows how much redistricting can impact Congress. It’s obvious that redistricting
creates less competitive seats in Congressional elections. This may be true
most of the time, but when crucial situations occur in the government
redistricting may not be as beneficial for incumbents as it may seem. Even
though redistricting is a state matter, this shows how much national politics
does affect the redistricting process. In cases like these, it could actually
screw over the incumbent if they don’t vote the way the party wants them to.
Situations like these prove a really interesting fact about redistricting,
especially this current case which is considered the “the worst gerrymander in
modern Pennsylvania history” (Lehigh Valley Live, 2013). This is that
gerrymandering may make safe seats for the party, but it doesn’t always create
safe seats for the actual incumbent.
This
situation created by the redistricting process has interesting connections to
Mayhew’s Electoral Connection. In Mayhew’s argument, he claims that the only
goal of Congress members is to get re-elected (Mayhew, 1975). He states that they
accomplish this in 3 ways: credit claiming, advertising, and position taking.
Dent is engaging in all of these activities in the midst of the government shut
down. He is blaming the extreme republicans [credit claiming], he is getting
his name and statements out through national news [advertising] and he is
clearly sticking with his view on what the government should do in order to end
this shutdown [position taking]. But whom is he doing all this for? In Mayhew’s
view, he didn’t really see parties as a big part of the re-election process;
therefore, he assumed Congressmen would be doing all of these things to impress
their constituents and be able to ensure re-election through them. But as seen
in the case with Dent, he has two groups of people he needs to impress in order
to get re-elected: his constituents and his own party. This shows the extreme
dual nature of Congressmen. Dent believes that voting on whatever will end the
shutdown is good for his constituents, but it may not be the decision that his
party wants him to make. His constituents may still like him and his approval
rating might stay high, but if his party offers up a more extreme Republican
candidate in the primary, Charlie may not even get that far. Therefore, an
extension of Mayhew’s view is shown in this situation. Of course Charlie wants
to get re-elected, but it’s not just his constituents that he has to impress.
In contrast with Mayhew’s time, he now also has a strong Republican party to
worry about as well. Like I said earlier, Charlie’s seat may be safe for now,
but that could be subject to change in the near future if the extreme
Republicans prevail in the midst of this government shutdown.
References:
David R. Mayhew, 1975. “The Electorate Incentive” in David
R. Mayhew, Congress: The Electoral Connection (Yale
University Press), 13-77.
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